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FROM THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE TO THE LOGIC
OF THE LIV ING
The relevance of Charles Peirce to biosemiotics
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D epartment of M athematics,Statistics,and Philosophy,FIN -33014 U niversity of Tampere,Finland
A bstract: B iosem iotics belongs to a class ofapproaches thatprovide mental models of life since it
appliessom e sem iotic conceptsin the explanation ofnaturalphenom ena.Such approaches
are typically open to anthropom orphic errors.U sually,the m ain source of such errors is
the excessive vagueness of the sem iotic concepts used.If the goalof biosem iotics is to
be accepted as a science and not as a priori m etaphysics,it needs both an appropriate
source of the sem iotic concepts and a reliable m ethod of adjusting them for biosem iotic
use. C harles S. Peirce’s philosophy offers a plausible candidate for both these needs.
B iosem ioticians have adopted notonly Peirce’s sem iotic concepts butalso a num ber of
m etaphysicalones.Itis show n thatthe application ofPeirce’s basic sem iotic conceptions
of sign and sign-process (semiosis) at the substantial level of biosem iotics requires the
acceptance of certain m etaphysical conceptions, i.e. Tychism and Synechism. Peirce’s
m ethod ofpragm aticism isofgreatrelevance to biosem iotics:1.Independently ofw hether
Peirce’s concepts are used or even applicable at the substantial level of biosem iotics,
Peirce’s m ethod rem ains valuable in making biosem iotics and especially in adjusting its
basic concepts.2.IfPeircean sem eiotic orm etaphysics is applied atthe substantiallevel
of biosem iotics,pragm aticism is valuable in clarifying the m eaning and reference of the
applied Peircean concepts. A s a consequence, som e restrictions for the application of
Peirce in biosem iotics are considered and the distinction ofPeirce’s philosophy from the
19th century idealistic N aturphilosophie is em phasized
K eyw ords: B iosem iotics,m ethod,concepts,Peirce,sem eiotic,m etaphysics,pragm aticism
1. B IOSEMIOTICS A ND PEIRCE
1.1. B iosem iotics as a MentalModelofLife
The w ord ‘biosem iotics’,being a com pound of‘bio’and ‘sem iotics’,refersliterally
to the union of the studies of (biological) life and signs. B ecause sem iotics is
257
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understood as a science, study, or doctrine of signs, biosemiotics is often charac-
terized as a ‘science of signs in living systems’ (e.g. Kull 1999: 386). Semiotic
concepts are commonly used, depending on the semiotic tradition, to refer to episte-
mological, linguistic, psychological, social, or cultural phenomena, i.e. usually to
some specifically human phenomena. In the tradition of biosemiotics, these concepts
(or their modifications) are nevertheless used in reference to non-human or not
specifically human living phenomena too. Biological life is seen therefore to be
analogous to mental life or to human sociality, notwithstanding the fact that the
human mind and sociality are essential parts of the biological life of the human
species.
The recognition of an analogy between mind and living nature has produced two
kinds of approaches or research strategies, both risky in their own peculiar way.
The naturalized models of mind focuses on mind and tries to naturalize it. This
includes evolutionary psychology, sociobiology, ‘neurophilosophy’ (Churchland
1989), and a form of evolutionary epistemology which studies scientific progress
(EET).1 They tend to commit naturalistic fallacies by using too economical or
restrictive explanatory principles resulting in a too simple and distorted picture
of the complexity of mental phenomena. The primary problem is not to do with
the simplistic character of the models in themselves but with its origins: that this
simplicity follows from the insufficient methods behind its construction — or from
some a priori decided physicalistic principles (cf. Barbieri: Editorial, this volume)—
and not from the studied reality itself.
W hile naturalistic models of mind pursue often a somewhat reductionistic
strategy, the other kinds of approaches, the mental models of life — to which
biosemiotics belongs— pursue typically a holistic strategy. They focus on natural
phenomena and try to model them on concepts that originally referred only to the
human mental or social sphere. Consequently, they fall easily into anthropomorphic
fallacies by predicating properties or qualities exclusive to humans to non-human
natural phenomena. The outcomes of such fallacies are either simply false descrip-
tions or, (more commonly) so utterly vague sketchings that it is extremely difficult or
impossible to judge their validity and other than their moral, religious, ideological,
or emotional significance.
Anthropomorphisms per se are not avoidable — not even in the extreme natural-
istic or physicalistic studies. All our concepts, even the ones of mainstream physics,
can be argued to have their origin in anthropomorphic metaphors or analogies, many
of them ultimately rooted in the aspects of our bodily self-experience (cf. Lakoff &
Johnson 1980). Metaphorical origins of scientific concepts are not problematic, but
when these concepts are abstracted and redefined for scientific purposes, anthro-
pomorphic errors may arise. The chief problem is how to identify and recognize
these anthropomorphic errors, i.e. the illegitimate uses of such redefined concepts
that are insufficiently, incompletely, or erroneously abstracted.
Besides biosemiotics, also an evolutionary epistemology which studies cognitive
mechanisms (EEM) and the Naturphilosophie of the 19th century G erman idealism
provide mental models of life. In all of these fields, some kind of continuity (even
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The Relevance of Charles Peirce to Biosemiotics 259
if only in the form of gradual steps) between non-human biological life and human
mental (i.e. logical, psychical, social, or ‘spiritual’) life is assumed. The forms of
mind and sign processes that one can find in biological life are often assumed to
be somewhat more primitive, simple, or general than that found in our own minds.
However, these three approaches differ from each other in other respects. For
example, while Schelling’s Naturphilosophie (Schelling 1984, orig. 1804) appeals to
transcendental arguments a priori in its reasoning, the evolutionary epistemologies
of D onald T. Campbell (1974, 1997) and Konrad Lorenz (1973) aim to naturalize
the concepts of knowledge and knowing when generalizing and abstracting them
and extending their domain of reference into the animal world and even further.
The basic explanatory scheme in evolutionary epistemology is the (N eo)-D arwinian
conception of natural selection.2
The longing for an all-inclusive metaphysical vision that would experientially
unite the nature of man with the nature of his/her environment, and a desire
for more narrowly scientific and naturalistic biosemiotic theories have both been
AQ 1
present in biosemiotic literature, and are presumably visible also in this volume.
Q uite often, the tension between these somewhat divergent forces can be found
under the surface of biosemiotic discourse and practices — the actual degree of
biosemioticians’ self-awareness about the motives and purposes of their making
biosemiotics evidently varies. I have argued elsewhere (Vehkavaara 2002, 2003)
that if biosemiotics is made as a science, it has to be practiced through certain
kinds of naturalistic methods, not necessarily (or hopefully) of a physicalistic,
reductionistic, or computational kind. The adopted semiotic concepts have to be
abstracted, extended, and adjusted appropriately for biosemiotic use so that the used
semiotic or mentalist concepts are first naturalized, operationalized, or formalized
before they are applied in biology. However, such naturalistic biosemiotics faces
the double risk, i.e. committing both naturalistic and anthropomorphic fallacies
at the same time.3 In any case, biosemiotics have to find appropriate and legit-
imate methods of redefining the semiotic or mental concepts it uses in describing
living phenomena (cf. Barbieri: Editorial, this volume). Still, there is a great
disagreement among the biosemioticians over what the correct standards of such
legitimation are.
Naturalized Models of
               Min d
– Evolutionary psychology
– S ociob iology
– ‘N e urophilosophy’
– Evolutionary
   e piste m ology (EET )
Men tal Models of L ife
Models  of L ife b y
n aturalized c on c ep tion
  ab out m en tal 
– Evolutionary
   e piste m ology (EEM )
Men tal Models
of L ife A priori
B i o s e m i o t i c s ?
– Naturphilosophie
Figure 1. Scientific approaches based on the analogy between mind and life
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1.2. Dynamical vs. Structural Approaches
The semiotic or mental concepts applied in biosemiotics have been appropriated
from various sources, not only from the traditions of semiotics, but also from
hermeneutics, semantics, linguistics, psychology, and from ordinary common sense,
i.e. from ‘folk psychology’ or ‘folk biology’. That tradition of biosemiotics which
has first recognized and named itself as biosemiotics, as put forward by Thomas
Sebeok (1963) and ‘microbiologisized’ later by Jesper Hoffmeyer and Claus
Emmeche (Hoffmeyer & Emmeche 1991;Emmeche & Hoffmeyer 1991;Hoffmeyer
1993) has followed the semiotic tradition originated by Charles S. Peirce (1839–
1914).4 Why has Peirce been chosen in this ‘Copenhagen-Tartu school of biosemi-
otics’ as a point of departure rather than the other major founding father of semiotics,
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913)? The reasons (or causes) are probably at least
partly accidental, i.e. partly due to the intellectual developments and milieu of the
thinking of Sebeok, Hoffmeyer, and other dominant figures. Nevertheless, some
substantial reasons can be found too.
Perhaps the most striking difference between Saussure’s semiology and Peirce’s
semeiotic5 is that Saussure emphasized the role of the static synchronic systemof signs
(langue) and defined his signs as having the dual character of signifié and signifiant
(i.e. signifier and signified). Saussure centered on social linguistic communication,
i.e. how individual psychical meanings become socially shared and communicated
through speech. Saussure’s prototype for the concept of sign was speech, the uttered
(and heard) phoneme, word, sentence, message, etc. (Saussure 1919).
Peirce’s starting point, in turn, was human cognition or cognition in general
(ability to learn and investigate), how and when the increase in knowledge is
AQ2
possible. For him, the prototype of sign was thought, a thought as a representation.
Peirce concentrated on dynamic sign processes (semiosis) and defined his concept
of sign as an irreducibly triadic composition of a representamen, its object, and
its interpretant.6 The irreducibility of this triadic composition means that its three
components have no identity as an object, representamen, and interpretant indepen-
dently of the whole sign they are part of. To put it simply, when a ( first) thing or
event is cognized as a representamen of some sign, it is recognized as referring to
another (second) thing or event, the object of that sign.7 This act of recognition is
 Representamen
O bject Interpretant
signifiant
signified
signifié
signifier
Figure 2. Basic forms of Saussurean and Peircean conceptions of sign
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manifested by the production of a third thing or event in the mind of a recognizer,
the interpretant of the sign.
In its creation as an interpretation of the representamen, the interpretant gains a
potentiality to function as another sign of the same object. And if this potentiality is
actualized, i.e. the interpretant is actually thought as the thought-sign, it will obtain
another interpretant that will in turn function as a new thought-sign and so forth
potentially ad infinitum. A whole chain of signs follows from a singular recognition
of a sign in temporal order (CP 2.228, c.1897). This process is called semiosis.
The unique character of semiosis is that it tends to be a progressive process. New
signs in the chain expose piecemeal the whole information content about the object
that the original representamen contained more or less hidden. In principle, there is
an obvious limit to this increase, a limit that may but need not be actually reached.
The ultimate end of the series, its final logical interpretant, is the full embodied
conception about the object, the conception that exhibits the whole cognitive content
mediated by the sign. There is nothing more to add to this final interpretant, it does
not receive a new interpretant anymore and therefore it does not have the nature
of sign. Instead, it appears as an undeniable or self-evident belief, as a habit of
action,8 the habit that is informed about the object via the chain of signs. Thus, the
Peircean conception of semiosis provides a theory or an analysis of how new habits
can be adopted, or the old habits can be modified. It is a theory or a description of
a rational learning process or gathering of information, a process of self-controlled
habit-formation. (EP 2:418, 1907.)
AQ3
It is said that the central task of biosemiotics is to introduce some concept
of meaning into biology (e.g., Barbieri, 2002, and Editorial, this volume). In
Saussure’s semiology, meanings become determined merely as differences within
the synchronic system of signs, i.e. they are identified only as differences between
the meanings expressible in the system. The structuralist approaches, having kinship
with (and the origin in) Saussure’s semiology, fit best to such biosemiotic applica-
tions where biological meanings are considered as the stable ready-made possibil-
ities of material objects or structures. The best biosemiotic example is the case of
R = Representamen
D I = D ynamic Interpretant
F I = F inal (L ogical) Interpretant
D I1 / R2
Object
D I2 / R3
F I = H abit of action
R1 Interpretation guided
by a Normative habit
Strengthens or
modifies
the habit of
interpretation
(feedback )
Figure 3. The chain of signs in Peircean conception of semiosis
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genetic code where basic amino acids are defined as the meanings of corresponding
codons.9 The question of a biosemiotic structuralist would be: What is the semiotic
structure to which the organism or other biosystem conforms?
However, if the focus shifts to the processes of life, a different question must be
asked, namely: How do organisms change their structures (or their environments)?
And the biological world is full of many kinds of processes: phylogenesis, ontoge-
nesis, conditioning and other forms of learning, protein synthesis, photosynthesis,
gaining the resistance to diseases, nest building, etc. Some of them are unique
or even potentially endless (e.g. phylogenesis) and others common and infinitely
repeated (e.g. protein synthesis). Moreover, it can be argued that living beings,
both organisms and their organizations (like ecosystems), do not merely partic-
ipate in various processes of life but that they are ontologically processes rather
than ‘things’ or static structures. Living systems are dissipative systems, thermo-
dynamically far from equilibrium and therefore they have to maintain themselves
continuously by their own action if they are going to preserve their stability and
identity (cf. Vehkavaara 2003, Bickhard 1998). If the attention in biosemiotics
is paid to the regularities of processes rather than to the ones of the structures,
a Peircean dynamic approach may appear a more promising starting point than
structural ones.
1.3. Peirce and Semeiotic as Logic
Charles Sanders Peirce was born in 1839 as the son of Benjamin Peirce, the leading
mathematician in the USA and a professor of mathematics in Harvard. From his
early childhood, he became acquainted with scientific community and under his
father’s guidance and support, he got the best available education in mathematics,
philosophy, and sciences (especially in chemistry, astronomy, and biology). Peirce
was trained to become a mathematical natural scientist and he earned his living for
over 30 years as an experimental physicist.10 Although he studied and published
in the various fields of mathematics, chemistry, geodesy, metrology, astronomy
(stellar spectroscopy), cartography, psychology, and history of science, Peirce’s
significance is evidently the greatest when it comes to his theoretical philosophy,
i.e. to his logic and metaphysics. Peirce himself thought logic as the science where
his greatest expertise is and his most durable achievements stand (Fisch 1982, xxiii
and Brent 1998, 38–39). Peirce describes his intellectual development and character
with the following modesty:
From the moment when I could think at all, until now, about forty years, I have been diligently and
incessantly occupied with the study of methods [of]inquiry, both those which have been and are pursued
and those which ought to be pursued. For ten years before this study began, I had been in training in
the chemical laboratory. I was thoroughly grounded not only in all that was then known of physics and
chemistry, but also in the way in which those who were successfully advancing knowledge proceeded.
I have paid the most attention to the methods of the most exact sciences, have intimately communed
with some of the greatest minds of our times in physical science, and have myself made positive contri-
butions — none of them of any very great importance, perhaps — in mathematics, gravitation, optics,
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Book_Barbieri_1402048130_Proof1_August 7, 2006
The Relevance of Charles Peirce to Biosemiotics 263
chemistry, astronomy, etc. I am saturated, through and through, with the spirit of the physical sciences.
I have been a great student of logic, having read everything of any importance on the subject, devoting
a great deal of time to medieval thought, without neglecting the works of the Greeks, the English, the
Germans, the French, etc., and have produced systems of my own both in deductive and in inductive logic.
In metaphysics, my training has been less systematic; yet I have read and deeply pondered upon all the
main systems, never being satisfied until I was able to think about them as their own advocates thought.
(CP 1.3, c.1897.)
Peirce is perhaps best known as one of the originators of modern formal logic, of
semiotics, and of the first originally American philosophical school, pragmatism.
Though much of his logical studies falls under current mathematical logic, for
Peirce, logic was principally a philosophical science.11 Peirce included both his
semeiotic and his version of pragmatism in the science of logic. Traditionally, logic
has been vaguely defined as an art of reasoning (cf. EP 2:11, 1895) but Peirce
wanted to develop logic as a science of reasoning that provides theories about
(the art of) reasoning (e.g. EP 2:30, 1898). More specifically, Peirce defined logic
as the science of deliberate or self-controlled thought.12 The special character of
logic —that distinguishes it from metaphysics and cognitive psychology as well as
from mathematics— is its normativity. Logic was defined as a normative science
of thought, a science that provides criteria for the goodness or badness of thought,
i.e. similar to ethics that functions as a normative science of action. The semiosis
is described as a self-normative process, where the continuous comparison of the
changing representamens with the object directs the sign-process internally — no
external authority, normativity, or criterion is needed.
Peirce’s conception that the emerging modern logic should be expressed in terms
of general semiotic, is based on his argument that all thought is mediated by signs.13
He had a number of reasons to think that thought and signs are intertwined. Firstly,
the peculiar character of signs was defined to be exactly their ability to mediate
thought or meaning. Secondly, Peirce insisted that only embodied thoughts can
be considered and that the embodiment of thought is a sign (EP 2:256, 1903).
Thirdly, from the very beginning of his philosophy, Peirce opposed all forms of
foundational intuitionism. He forcefully argued that no intuition, no more sensuous
than intellectual, could guarantee an unconditionally or absolutely certain foundation
for knowledge. If all ‘intuition’, i.e. direct or non-mediated reference to the object
of thought, is impossible, as Peirce argued, all thought have to be mediated by signs
(cf. CP 5.213–215, 251–253, 1868).
2. HOW PEIRCE’S SEMEIOTIC CAN BE APPLIED
IN METAPHY SICS AND BIOSEMIOTICS
2.1. From Logic to Metaphysics
Presumably, Peirce was originally studied by biosemioticians because of his
semeiotic, but it seems that his metaphysical insights (and the metaphysical reading
of his semeiotic) have inspired more influentially the biosemioticians of the
Copenhagen-Tartu school.14 The Peircean concept of sign and scheme of semiosis
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are nevertheless primarily logical conceptions, the prototype of semiosis is clearly
an inquiry or the scientific process of investigation.15 How could such scheme of
semiosis be applicable also in natural processes that seem to be —at least on the
surface— of a quite different nature? Would not such an attempt lead to some
apparent anthropomorphic error? As a normative science of thought, logic per
se cannot take into account where its concepts are applied but they need to get
firstly a metaphysical interpretation that can be further applied in different special
processes of life. Can such application escape being in its heart just one more a
priori system of rationalistic metaphysics, comparable with the ones of Descartes,
Leibniz, Spinoza, Wolff, Hegel, and Schelling?
Part of the fascination of Peirce’s metaphysics is that it includes elements that
can be applied —or abused— by both those who are attracted to the transcen-
dental argumentation of a priori philosophy and those who are more naturalistically
minded. It seems to fulfil both underlying intellectual needs of biosemioticians:
a longing for an experientially understood metaphysical union of man and nature
as well as a need for an experimentally relevant (and justified) biosemiotic theory.
Two questions need to be answered:
1. How can Peirce’s theory of rational inquiry be thought to be applicable in
modelling the natural processes of life?
2. Can such application be something more relevant than just one more a priori
system of metaphysics?
2.2. Chance and Continuity
In the second half of the 19th century, the main rivals in metaphysics were the naïve
mechanistic materialism of classical positivism and the teleological determinism of
absolute or religious idealism. Peirce rejected both the mechanistic and teleological
doctrines of inevitable predestination, instead, he proposed a hypothesis that pure
chance is a real force in nature. This notion that absolute chance is a factor of the
universe Peirce called Tychism (CP 6.201, 1898). That nature has the element of
unpredictable spontaneity, does not nevertheless mean that there would not be real
regularities or law s of nature too.16 The regularity of phenomena is not denied but
the assumption of the exactitude and absoluteness of natural laws is seen unjustified.
At least, there can not be any empirical evidence for that:
Those observations which are generally adduced in favor of mechanical causation simply prove that
there is an element of regularity in nature, and have no bearing whatever upon the question of
whether such regularity is exact and universal or not. Nay, in regard to this exactitude, all obser-
vation is directly opposed to it; and the most that can be said is that a good deal of this obser-
vation can be explained away. Try to verify any law of nature, and you will find that the more
precise your observations, the more certain they will be to show irregular departures from the law.
We are accustomed to ascribe these, and I do not say wrongly, to errors of observation; yet we
cannot usually account for such errors in any antecedently probable way. Trace their causes back far
enough and you will be forced to admit they are always due to arbitrary determination, or chance.
(CP 6.46, 1892.)
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Peirce’s rejection of mechanical determinism is thus based partly on his experience
as an experimental scientist and specifically on his awareness about the limita-
tions of the methods of experimentation and statistical generalizing. The deter-
ministic demand on the exactitude of natural laws is judged as a mere a priori
assumption, but if it is not assumed a priori, the observed inexactitude of laws
can be accepted to be partly due to their very nature as well. This is the doctrine
of Synechism, which is the most characteristic feature of Peirce’s evolutionary
metaphysics and of which Tychism is only a corollary (CP 8.252, 1897). It accepts
“that being is a matter of more or less”, that there is real vagueness in nature, i.e.
vagueness that is not due to our unclear conceptions and imperfect knowledge. As
a regulative principle of logic, it refers to “the tendency to regard everything as
continuous” (CP 7.565, 1892)17 and the reasons to accept it also as a metaphysical
doctrine are logical as well. According to Peirce, the atomistic assumption that
the nature is a composition of in principle inexplicable ultimate parts leads to
the pernicious expectance that the perfect and complete knowledge is in principle
achievable. Synechism, in turn, “amounts to the principle that inexplicabilities are
not to be considered as possible explanations.” (CP 6.173, 1902.) The synechistic
hypothesis makes it possible to conjoin law and chance, scientific realism and
Tychism. It is a matter of science to study which part of all observed inexactitudes
and irregularities are due to our cognitive insufficiency and which part to real
vagueness.
Although some of Peirce’s arguments for Tychism, Synechism, and his other
metaphysical hypotheses can no more be judged so forcing as before, the general
world view that they draw has become more easily acceptable in the light of the
contemporary theories of chaos, dynamic systems, self-organization, and catas-
trophe than before these mathematical theories were known. The origin of Tychism
and Synechism are, however, in those achievements in the science of 1850’s —most
notably the statistical mechanics (of gases) and Darwinian evolution— that exploited
or included the assumption about influential chance. Especially in Darwinian
evolution, all the novelties come from spontaneous, ‘random’ variation.18 But the
possibility of the reality of such spontaneity was denied by the Newtonian deter-
ministic world view. As hypotheses, Tychism and Synechism were created to fill
that gap. They were not intended to legitimate the appealing to miracles as an
explanatory principle,19 but to participate in the general explanation of observed
regularities, moreover, of the apparent novelties and the increase in complexity and
diversity in nature:
But my hypothesis of spontaneity does explain irregularity, in a certain sense; that is, it explains the
general fact of irregularity, though not, of course, what each lawless event is to be. At the same time,
by thus loosening the bond of necessity, it gives room for the influence of another kind of causation,
such as seems to be operative in the mind in the formation of associations, and enables us to understand
how the uniformity of nature could have been brought about. (CP 6.60, 1892)
The acceptance of Tychism (or some other equivalent rejection of determinism)
is vital for biosemiotics, and especially for such biosemiotics that strives to apply
Peirce’s semeiotic. In the deterministic world where no genuine choices are possible,
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whatever is called meaning or meaningful would not have any significance as
meaning — meanings would be reduced to mere epiphenomena. Only in the world
equipped with genuine choices, there is any sense in talking about the success or
failure of interpretation — if there were no possibility to err (or to avoid errors), the
sign processes would not have their distinctive character. Some amount of freedom
or indeterminacy is a prerequisite for any genuine normativity required by semiosis.
Thus, the acceptance of Tychism opens up the possibility of applying semeiotic in
natural processes without dictating to what extent it is possible.20
Even if it may look at first glance that natural processes and mental processes
are of totally different kinds, this glance may prove to be an illusion due to our
too concrete and biased level of consideration. If the concept of mind or thought
is abstracted far enough21 so that only the joint features of natural and mental
processes are left in its redefinition, then the logical concepts of sign and semiosis
may be applicable both in the psychical processes of rational thought and in some
natural processes. The task of biosemiotics is firstly to make such abstraction and
redefinition of its basic concepts and then to study which natural processes are
semiotic in nature and which ones are not (or to what extent they are semiotic).
Still, the self-critical task of biosemiotics is not to be forgotten, the task to detect
anthropomorphic errors in its own argumentation and concepts.
2.3. Making Biosemiotics and Peirce
Biosemioticians have adopted some concepts, ideas, and slogans from Peirce’s
semiotic and metaphysical writings and proposed that they are applicable in the
theories about cognition and mutual communication of animals, prokaryotes, plants,
and even intracellular communication. However, it is still an open question whether
this kind of application will eventually prove insufficient or distorted — a hidden
fatal anthropomorphic error cannot be excluded. Although such failure at the
substantial level of biosemiotics would be realized, Peirce’s semeiotic might still
remain valuable at the methodological level, i.e. if it is applied in the making
of biosemiotics, and especially, in the formation of its basic theoretical concepts.
This aspect of Peirce’s philosophy has so far been mostly neglected by biosemi-
oticians. Whatever the best applicable source of basic semiotic concepts is — be
it Peirce, Saussure, Bateson, Lotman or others— Peirce’s philosophy offers us a
method of adjusting them properly. Namely, one of the main purposes of his whole
semiotic was to develop methods of how to make our ideas clear.22 Within his
Synechism, Peirce accepted that the world in itself contains (or may contain) some
real vagueness. This, however, does not mean that we should be satisfied with
the usual vagueness of our conceptions, but only that there is no inherent exact
meanings hidden in our vague ideas — we have no ‘clear intuitions’ to appeal to.
The general purpose of all scientific inquiry is to provide us the definite and well
defined scientific concepts that are transparent in both their reference and meaning.
How they can be developed from the vague ideas of our mind, how the necessary
vagueness of our concepts could be diminished is a task of logical studies, i.e.
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of semeiotic. Every new scientific endeavour consists necessarily of mere vague
ideas at the beginning and biosemiotics is still at its beginning. The basic semiotic
concepts used in biosemiotics are usually far from definite or clear and desperately
need some grounding in concrete observations and experiments.
Moreover, besides being relevant (1) in the making of biosemiotics, when basic
biosemiotic concepts are formed and defined, the understanding of Peirce’s method-
ological principles would be relevant (2) in understanding Peirce himself, when
the proposed substantial theory of biosemiotics applies concepts with the Peircean
origin. Because Peirce is a far from an easy thinker to make sense, it should be more
than clarifying to acknowledge what Peirce’s own attitude toward his concepts and
arguments was. This can be approached by considering how Peirce himself applied
his own methodical principles when he composed his concepts and theory.
3. HOW TO MAKE OUR IDEAS CLEAR — PRAGMATICISM
3.1. Pragmatic Maxim as a Definition of Meaning
Peirce called his general methodology for science pragmatism, or more specifically,
pragmaticism.23 For him, pragmaticism is not a system of philosophy but only a
method of thinking (CP 8.206, c.1905), “a method of ascertaining the meanings of
hard words and of abstract concepts” (CP 5.464, 1907). The core of pragmaticism
is thus merely a definition of meaning.
In order to ascertain the meaning of an intellectual conception one should consider what practical
consequences might conceivably result by necessity from the truth of that conception; and the sum of
these consequences will constitute the entire meaning of the conception. (CP 5.9, 1907)
This cryptic definition, the pragmatic maxim, requires some explications. Firstly, the
pragmatic maxim was designed to define only the meanings of intellectual concepts,
i.e. conceptions that are in principle open for somewhat deliberate adoption or
rejection (CP 5.467, 1907).
Secondly, Peirce’s pragmaticism did not declare that practical utility would be
the ultimate value or that the meaning of a conception would be its realized practical
consequences. Pragmaticism should not be confused with forms of utilitarianism or
instrumentalism. The full meaning of a conception is not reducible to any actual
consequential events, instead, it contains also those possible consequences that will
not but would be actualized if the circumstances were differently.
Intellectual concepts [  ] essentially carry some implication concerning the general behaviour either of
some conscious being or of some inanimate object, and so convey [  ] the “would-acts,” “would-dos” of
habitual behaviour; and no agglomeration of actual happenings can ever completely fill up the meaning
of a “would-be.” (CP 5.467, 1907).
Thirdly, since the meaning of a concept is not any individual event or thing but a
group of certain kinds of ‘would-bes’, it must be another conception, an anticipative
conception that anticipates or refers to the possible future effects of the concept.
Moreover, this anticipation is about some ‘habitual behaviour’, either of our action,
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or of the action of something else, the habitual behaviour of which we can adapt
our action self-controlledly.24 This is the meaning of ‘practical’ in the definition.
Fourthly, all this does not, however, mean that the meaning of a proposition,
say, about the big bang would be emptied in its direct practical applications in
our life. Quite the opposite, the pragmatic maxim was designed to provide the
conception of meaning especially for those intellectual concepts towards which our
interest is purely theoretical. Our activity ‘to find out’, to make experiments, is also
included in such human conduct, to which a proposition that exposes the meaning is
applicable:
[  ] that form of the proposition which is to be taken as its meaning [  ] must be simply the general
description of all the experimental phenomena which the assertion of the proposition virtually predicts.
For an experimental phenomenon is the fact asserted by the proposition that action of a certain description
will have a certain kind of experimental result; and experimental results are the only results that can
affect human conduct. (CP 5.427, 1905)
3.2. Pragmaticist Biosemiotics
If biosemiotics would meet this criterion for meaningfulness, i.e. if the biosemiotic
theory could provide some experimental results that no other kind of theory could,
that would legitimate the biosemiotic approach in an instant. It may be that this
criterion is too demanding for contemporary biosemiotics thus far, but as a guiding
goal in developing biosemiotic concepts, it is worth attempting. At least, a simple
‘armchair test’ of the meaningfulness of the biosemiotic concepts should be made by
comparing them with their non-biosemiotic alternatives. Does a biosemiotic expla-
nation or point of view bring anything really differing at the level of experimental
testing or of practical applications?
For the maxim of pragmatism is that a conception can have no logical effect or import differing from
that of a second conception except so far as, taken in connection with other conceptions and intentions,
it might conceivably modify our practical conduct differently from that second conception. (EP 2:234,
1903)
The main obstacle to making such comparisons is the abstract, vague, and
metaphorical character of the mostly used semiotic concepts in biosemiotics. The
possible experimental or practical bearings of the concepts of that kind are impos-
sible to be ‘conceived’ with accuracy. The meanings that they are intended to carry
are mere blurry feelings and as such as they are difficult to identify and control.
The temptation to speak vaguely is understandable, since it leaves the backdoor
open for excuses and corrective additions that would specify —or even construct—
the vague or partly unconscious ad hoc meaning.
It is easy to speak with precision upon a general theme. Only, one must commonly surrender all ambition
to be certain. It is equally easy to be certain. One has only to be sufficiently vague. (CP 4.237, 1902.)
What can be done in order to make the biosemiotic ideas clearer so that they might
be put in an experimental test? In the original formulation of the pragmatic maxim,25
the intellectual meaning of a concept consists of its ‘conceivable practical bearings’,
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Book_Barbieri_1402048130_Proof1_August 7, 2006
The Relevance of Charles Peirce to Biosemiotics 269
but those ‘practical bearings’ are the ones of the object —i.e. the referent— of
the conception. Thus, in order to determine the pragmatic meaning of a scientific
concept, to get the better control over its possible future products, i.e. over its
potential interpretants, we need a control over the intended (or assumed) objects
of the concept too. This hidden demand is underlined in another formulation of the
maxim of pragmaticist:
The elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit
at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passports at both those two gates is to be
arrested as unauthorized by reason. (EP 2:241, CP 5.212, 1903)
Thus, the control over the formation of our concepts constitutes an essential part in
the anticipation of its whole pragmatic meaning. Concepts are derived from some
kind of perception and the circumstances of the observation of that perception
may become structured in the concept. The observation plays a double role —
scientific concepts are originated by observation and their meaning is dependent on
the would-be observation of the would-be results of their would-be experimental
testing. For instance, the majority of cognitive (or communicative) concepts are
originally based on the observation of some common internal experience of sensing,
knowing, understanding, intending, etc. They are nevertheless later abstracted or
formalized and, especially in biosemiotics, extended to refer also to such non-
human phenomena (like animal cognition) about which we cannot have internal
experience. But if the concepts are abstracted without clear awareness about their
derivations, some hidden presumptions may have remain in the structure of these
concepts, the presumptions that make them not extendable beyond a human sphere.
Therefore, scientific concepts cannot be accepted merely as (culturally or intuitively)
‘given’ — their ‘derivations’ remain more or less hidden with the consequence that
also the meanings of such culturally given everyday concepts remain too vague for
scientific use.
The concepts we use even in science are originally vague, but they can be made
‘clear and distinct’ and one method of achieving this is to analyze the path of the
formation of concepts and the observations (or experiences) that are their points
of departure. This analysis does not determine the referents of the concepts under
scrutiny, they are after all abstracted, but it may suggest the possible referents of
the concepts, and most of all, exhibit the errors that stay easily hidden.
3.3. Pragmaticism Applied Back to Itself
However, there is one remaining problem, whether Peirce’s ‘tychastic Synechism’
is more than a metaphysical system a priori. The differences between Peirce’s
approach and a priori philosophy like Schelling’s Naturphilosophie or Kant’s
transcendental idealism can be best illustrated if we apply the pragmatic maxim to
Peirce’s concepts themselves. We should therefore scrutinise carefully what kind of
invisible structural presuppositions are built into his concepts prior to their appli-
cation to biological theory. This cannot be done properly here (see some details
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in Vehkavaara 2006), but some guidelines can nevertheless be given. We can
study 1. what kind of practical bearings he conceived his logical and metaphysical
concepts as having and 2. what kind of perception Peirce’s derivation of his concepts
starts from.
If we consider specifically the pragmatic maxim i.e. the conceivable practical
consequences of the pragmatic maxim, Peirce himself characterized pragmatism
(in a dictionary article) as being the “opinion that metaphysics is to be largely
cleared up by the application of the [pragmatic] maxim for attaining clearness of
apprehension” (CP 5.2, 1902). So, the intended practical bearing of the pragmatic
maxim itself was to free us from floppy a priori metaphysics. It was hoped
to wipe them away by showing that endless disputes without any conceivable
practical —i.e. experimental— differences are senseless.26 The pragmatic maxim
provides quite hard criteria of intellectual meaning especially for metaphysical
and logical concepts. The fact that the maxim was originally designed to settle the
stubborn nonsensical quarrels of metaphysical and religious doctrines does not,
however, limit its potential practical bearings, which Peirce clearly intended to
cover all scientific or rational thought. The open question of biosemiotics is, can
the pragmatic maxim be applied, extended, or further abstracted so that it could
work as a base for biological meaning too?
Next we have to ask, in the light of the pragmatic maxim, what kind of perception
Peirce’s logical and metaphysical concepts are based on and what consequences we
can draw from that.
4. CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATICISM IN UNDERSTANDING
PEIRCE
4.1. Observation in Sciences — Metaphysics is not the ‘First
Philosophy’
Peirce expressed quite explicitly what kind of perception or experience the elements
of philosophical concepts are derived from. He recognized three kinds of observation
that separate the three classes of Theoretical science.27
1. Pure mathematics is based on the observation of imagined objects without any
guarantee of their application in the actual world. It can describe only the possible
forms that things (including thought) may take in our universe. It is a pure
science of hypotheses providing no positive information about the actual reality
of our universe. As such it is the negative science. (CP 2.782, 1901, CP 1.247,
2.77, 1902.)
2. Theoretical philosophy (Philosophia prima) draws its conclusions from the
observation of universal phenomena that “come within the range of every man’s
normal experience, and for the most part in every waking hour of his life” (CP
1.241, 1902). The findings of philosophy should thus be derivable from familiar
experience common to everyone.
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3. Special sciences are based on the special experience aided with instruments and
other special arrangements and on the analysis of its minute details. Special
sciences discover new phenomena by expanding the ordinary limits of human
experience.28
These three classes form a nested hierarchy according to the abstractness of the
objects of study specific to each science (CP 1.180, 1903). All sciences may use
the same experiential content as the ‘data’ for their inquiries, but they observe
different facts from that ‘data’, the facts that lead to generalizations at the different
levels of abstraction (CP 8.297, 1904). Each special science observes from this
‘data’ the special information peculiar to it — astronomy pays attention to astro-
nomically relevant data, etc. Philosophy observes general information that could
in principle have been achieved from any other ‘data’ too. Because the observed
universal experience is present in any experience, also in those special experiences
which special sciences observe, the familiar every day experience suffices for the
observational basis of philosophy. Mathematics, in turn, extracts a mere possible
form from the’data’, the form the properties of which are in that sense independent
on any actually perceived ‘data’ that merely imagined ‘data’ would suffice for the
source of mathematical inquiries.29
The general principle of this hierarchy is that lower sciences rest for their
principles upon (some of) the higher ones that, in turn, draw their data in part
from the lower ones and furnish them with applications (EP 2:35, 1898, EP 2:458,
1911, cf. also Kent 1987: 18). The subclasses of each class of Theoretical science
inherit this principle. With regard to the two major subclasses of philosophy, Peirce
kept logic a more abstract science than metaphysics (EP 2:35–36, 1898). Since
metaphysics, the philosophical science of the most general facts of the reality,
is based on the observation of universal experience, it can be asked how such
knowledge is possible or whether it is possible at all. On what grounds the correct
metaphysics could be argued for, since such knowledge —because of being the most
general kind— should be independent on any particular observation or experience
and compatible with all possible experience. Peirce followed Immanuel Kant’s
solution of this problem by rejecting the traditional idea about metaphysics as the
‘first philosophy’, instead, the basic metaphysical concepts should be applied logical
ones (EP 2:30–31, 1898) — i.e. logic is prior to metaphysics. The biosemiotic
practice of applying Peirce’s logical concepts with a metaphysical tone is thus in
principle compatible with Peirce’s own application. Nevertheless, such applications
are always vulnerable to anthropomorphic errors and excess vagueness.
The independence of logic from metaphysics means that the reality of thought is
not a logical question — the science of logic cannot decide whether there is any
thought in animals, for instance. The logical concept of sign should be independent
of embraced metaphysical principles as well as of the findings of natural sciences,
For example, the acceptance of Tychism or Synechism is not required for the
acceptance of the Peircean conception of sign. However, the application of logical
concepts in metaphysics and in biology is dependent on embraced metaphysical and
biological conceptions. Many (though not all) forms of ontological physicalism, for
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Book_Barbieri_1402048130_Proof1_August 7, 2006
272 Vehkavaara
instance, are incompatible with all possible applications of Peircean conception of
sign. At least some amount of real indeterminacy (which does not necessarily mean
free will) is required in order to make real sign processes genuinely normative.
The independence of special sciences on logic and metaphysics gives a quite
demanding criterion for the generality of philosophical propositions: philosophical
generalizations should be in accordance with all experiential data of all kinds.
Although special sciences cannot provide any principles for philosophy, they may
provide critique (even if indirect) for philosophical conceptions. The new findings
in special sciences may demonstrate that the philosophical concepts derived from
familiar experience have not been abstracted enough but that they are after all
formulated in unnecessarily concrete or intricate terms (cf. CP 2.75, 1902) — i.e.
that they include naturalistic or anthropomorphic errors.
AQ4
4.2. Transcendental and Objective Perspectives
In the tradition of transcendental philosophy put forward by Immanuel Kant, the
concepts of metaphysics are grounded on transcendental logic. In Kantian scheme,
all our knowledge is admitted to begin with experience, but not so that all of it
would arise out of experience. Instead, Kant assumed that
our empirical knowledge is a compound of that which we receive through impressions, and that which
the faculty of cognition supplies from itself (Kant 1781/1787: 1 [B1]).
That part of our knowledge which is in our faculty of cognition itself, must in this
Kantian scheme be independent on the empirical or a posteriori part, i.e. it is a
priori, prior to senses. The term transcendental refers in the Kantian tradition to
concepts focusing on such a priori forms of all possible knowledge:
I apply the term transcendental to all knowledge which is not so much occupied with objects as with the
mode of our cognition of these objects, so far as this mode of cognition is possible à priori. A system
of such conceptions would be called Transcendental philosophy. (Kant 1781/1787: 15 [B24].)
Theoretical science
Mathematics P hilosophy
Logic Metaphysics
 Special
sciences
‘P hysics’
‘P sychics’
   P ractical
   sciences
(including e.g.
-  engineering
- medical sci.
-  conventional 
   ethics)
Degree of abstractness of the objects of study (i.e. of observed objects)
high
low
Figure 4. Overview to Peirce’s conception about the relations of sciences (before c. 1902)30
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Peirce’s conception about the philosophical observation on which theoretical
philosophy is based is an apparent descendant of Kantian conception of transcen-
dental philosophy. The philosophical observation of universal experience included
in any experience is obvious counterpart for the Kantian idea of transcendental a
priori form of cognition. Because logic should be derivable from any experience
(plus mathematics), i.e. from familiar every day experience, it becomes intimately
bound with ‘our’ perspective and ordinary life. The ‘positive facts’ that logic can
tell us concern the form of our internal epistemic relation with the world we live.
This may bring some restrictions on the biosemiotic applicability of Peircean logical
concepts.
For instance, the Peirce’s original derivation of his concept of sign (CP
1.545–559, 1867) was the construction of the concepts of representamen, object,
and interpretant and their irreducible triadic coalition as a sign. The derivation was
executed by directing the investigating thought into itself in order to find out how
it can refer to its object and state something about it. A present thought is directed
to observe itself, i.e. directed toward its origin, toward its object, to find truth
about it, and at the same time, it becomes transformed into another more self-aware
thought-sign about itself, into its interpretant. The interpretant was produced as a
means of grasping the true knowledge about the object of thought-sign. Because
the interpretant is constructed by looking for truth about the object, the aim toward
truth —the logical normativity— is already built in the construction of the triadic
structure of sign, no matter how it will be considered or what will be considered
in it. This analysis suggests —if it is correct— that Peircean concept of sign may
not be as general concept that is often assumed. Consequently, its applicability in
biosemiotics is restricted, if it is accepted that the ultimate criterion of goodness
for living systems is survival or sufficient fitness and not so much the truthfulness
of their representations. (See more in Vehkavaara 2006.)
However, besides the above described transcendental perspective, Peirce
employed also a perspective that could be called the objective perspective, because
within it, a sign is no more considered merely from the perspective of its own,
but the whole chain of signs, the whole semiosic process or succession of signs,
is taken as an object of study. The investigating mind is methodically split into
the ‘observer-mind’ and ‘observed-mind’ so that a present investigating thought in
observer’s head is no more considered as a part of the object of study. The objective
perspective is inevitable for any biosemiotic application of semiotic, because it can
be applied to study other minds — it frees us to study and think about non-human
minds and non-conscious sign processes. The description of semiosis in Chapter
1.2 (see Figure 3) was a description from the objective perspective. The distinction
between these two perspectives is essential when Peirce’s statements concerning
signs are considered. (See more in Vehkavaara 2006.)
Peirce’s metaphysics inherits the similar ‘transcendental’ character from logic. As
metaphysics draws its positive content only from the universal features of ordinary
experience, the most general facts that it describes must concern their accessibility
to us, i.e. the form that they ‘necessarily’ take in our mind (independently on their
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Book_Barbieri_1402048130_Proof1_August 7, 2006
274 Vehkavaara
more concrete content). For instance, in his paper “Evolutionary Love” (EP 1:352–
371, 1893), Peirce demonstrates there being two other kinds of evolution besides a
tychastic one by fortuitous variation. The other two were anancastic evolution by
mechanical necessity and agapastic evolution by ‘evolutionary love’ i.e. by force
of a self-organizing habit. They were all considered as real powers in the world but
they are, however, only three possible forms that real processes may take, three real
possibilities that should not be excluded a priori when some specific real process
is investigated. Whether or not an individual process (be it chemical, geological,
celestial, phylogenetic, epigenetic, metabolic, psycho-dynamic, communicative,
etc.) is dominated by ‘creative love’, for instance, is not properly a metaphysical
quarrel. It is dependent on the observation of the appropriate special phenomenon
and therefore belongs under the corresponding special science.
AQ5
4.3. Fallibilism — Transcendental but not a Priori
Although Peirce’s conception about philosophical observation gives to his
philosophy a kind of ‘transcendental flavour’ that even the adoption of objective
perspective cannot completely strike out, it is nevertheless not transcendental
a priori. Whereas for Kant the a priori conditions of cognition have to be undeniable
“with the full guarantee for validity” (Kant 1781/1787: 16), for Peirce, the philo-
sophical observation is by no means infallible although its pitfalls are different
than what special sciences face.31 Because all sciences and all rational thought is
based on the observation of some kind of perception, there are strictly speaking no
a priori concepts at all, no concepts ‘prior to senses’. For Peirce, there is no pure
knowledge a priori, i.e. no purely a priori certain knowledge in a Kantian sense,
observer / researcher
observed
mind or sign
represented
object of the
observed sign
observer-
mind
observed
mind
represented
   object  
confluence
‘transcendental ego’
  (self-)
observation
inter-
action
(A ) (B )
 
observation
Figure 5. Observation from the objective perspective (A), and from the transcendental perspective (B)
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Book_Barbieri_1402048130_Proof1_August 7, 2006
The Relevance of Charles Peirce to Biosemiotics 275
because there is no such knowledge with which “no empirical element is mixed
up” (Kant 1781/1787: 2).32
With this assumption about the observational origin of all the elements of
knowledge, Peirce breaks with the mainstream of modern philosophy. Namely,
Peirce argues that no absolute infallibility or certainty is accessible in any human
endeavour.33 The fallibility of human sensations is widely accepted (and experi-
entially supported), but it is quite rare in the philosophy of western tradition
that this fallibilism is extended even into mathematics.34 If even mathematics is
accepted as fallible without any commitment to nihilism or extreme scepticism,
then philosophy, i.e. logic and metaphysics, certainly follows. Peirce did not expect
that internal senses, on which mathematics, philosophy and, parts of the psychical
special sciences lean, would provide any more epistemically privileged information
than external senses. Inconceivability, unimaginability, or indubitability, which are
often appealed to when rationalistic a priori doctrines are tried to justify, are
historically proven to be far from infallible.
But that which has been inconceivable today has often turned out indisputable on the morrow. Inability
to conceive is only a stage through which every man must pass in regard to a number of beliefs [  ].
His understanding is enslaved to some blind compulsion which a vigorous mind is pretty sure soon to
cast off. (CP 6.49, 1892)
The task of philosophy is not to dwell on infallible truths or any other a priori
certain foundation for scientific knowledge. It would be a grave error to read Peirce
as if he would aim to provide a foundational basis of science, a new foundation
upon which the house of the new science would be built. Throughout his scien-
tific career, Peirce opposed such a Cartesian dream about the absolutely certain
foundation of knowledge that has been governing modern philosophy at least since
the days of Descartes (e.g. CP 5.264–265, 1868). Instead, he called his attitude
toward philosophy a ‘laboratory-philosophy’ contrasting it with the philosophies
of ‘theological seminaries’ (CP 1.129, 1905) referring especially to Hegel and
Schelling, the major representatives of idealistic Naturphilosophie.
[M]y attitude was always that of a dweller in a laboratory, eager only to learn what I did not yet know,
and not that of philosophers bred in theological seminaries, whose ruling impulse is to teach what they
hold to be infallibly true. (CP 1.4, 1897)
Peirce describes his attitude of ‘laboratory-philosophy’ as follows:
Thus, in brief, my philosophy may be described as the attempt of a physicist to make such conjecture
as to the constitution of the universe as the methods of science may permit, with the aid of all that
has been done by previous philosophers. I shall support my propositions by such arguments as I
can. Demonstrative proof is not to be thought of. The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all
moonshine. The best that can be done is to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of all likelihood, in the
general line of growth of scientific ideas, and capable of being verified or refuted by future observers.
(CP 1.7, 1897)
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Despite all his rejection of a priori knowledge, encouragement to ‘laboratory-
philosophy’, and mocking of the philosophies of ‘theological seminaries’, Peirce
nevertheless appreciated some of the results of the great German Idealists: Kant,
Hegel, and Schelling (CP 1.21, 1903). However, even if their a priori method of
reasoning would produce some valid conclusions, such success would more or less
be due to an accident — Peirce could not see much sense in the argumentation
by which they reasoned to obtain these results. Such a priori method does not
provide tenable means to distinguish the apparent errors that they include from the
valid conclusions. Moreover, their aim or longing to provide some a priori certain
foundation for science leads to an understandable but harmful habit of giving an
infallible status to such a priori results, i.e. removing them outside of the target
area of inquiry.
For Peirce, the results do not make a science but the way they are produced, and
this applies to logic and metaphysics too. Perhaps the most important lesson that
biosemioticians should learn from Peirce is his attitude toward science, science that
includes also metaphysics and semiotic. It is the attitude of potential impermanence
of all the scientific results that we ever can derive, the attitude that emphasizes the
making our scientific concepts and ideas clearer and clearer, i.e. that their pragmatic
meaning and conceptual structure would be better and better exposed. It is the
attitude that whatever our embraced logical and metaphysical principles are, they
are not believed and taken as the premises of our inquiry but they are considered
as hypotheses that have to be argued for instead. For Peirce, beliefs should have no
role in scientific argumentation, except as a source of hypotheses but as such, they
are strictly speaking no more fully believed. All convictions and beliefs are judged
by Peirce as harmful in science:
I hold that what is properly and usually called belief [  ] has no place in science at all. We believe the
proposition we are ready to act upon. [  ] But pure science has nothing at all to do with action. The
propositions it accepts, it merely writes in the list of premisses it proposes to use [  ] and the whole
list is provisional. The scientific man is not in the least wedded to his conclusions. He risks nothing
upon them. He stands ready to abandon one or all as soon as experience opposes them. Some of them,
I grant, he is in the habit of calling established truths; but that merely means propositions to which no
competent man today demurs. [… ] Still, it may be refuted tomorrow; and if so, the scientific man will
be glad to have got rid of an error. There is thus no proposition at all in science which answers to the
conception of belief. (CP 1.635, 1898.)35
The pure scientific attitude that Peirce forcefully expounded is that we should not
allow some general world view based on our more or less uncontrolled impres-
sions36 and ‘seemings’ dictate what kind of explanations, descriptions, and concepts
are in principle acceptable in science. That attitude, if applied to the making of
biosemiotics, would eventually make it a science.
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NOTES
1 Michael Bradie has distinguished two interrelated but distinct programs which both go by the name
‘evolutionary epistemology’. ‘EET’ is an abbreviation of the ‘evolutionary epistemology of theories’,
which “attempts to account for the evolution of ideas, scientific theories and culture in general by using
models and metaphors drawn from evolutionary biology.” ‘EEM’, the ‘evolutionary epistemology of
mechanisms’ in turn, attempts “to account for the characteristics of cognitive mechanisms in animals and
humans by a straight-forward extension of the biological theory of evolution to those aspects or traits
of animals which are the biological substrates of cognitive activity, e.g., their brains, sensory systems,
motor systems, etc.” (Bradie 1986: 403.)
2 More properly, the explanatory principle in evolutionary epistemology is the general selection theory
that is abstracted from the principle of natural selection (Campbell 1997: 7).
3 In Vehkavaara (2002), I suggested a method of semiotic naturalism that would minimize the risk to
fall on these fallacies.
4 Peirce is not the only source of the semiotic ideas of this school of biosemiotics. Jakob von Uexküll
and Gregory Bateson have obviously been just as influential as Peirce and some concepts have been
borrowed from the cultural semiotics of Juri Lotman (like ‘semiosphere’).
5 The term ‘semiotic’ here refers to the overall field of discourse or discipline that concerns signs.
‘Semeiotic’ and ‘Semiology’ are used to refer to Peirce’s and Saussure’s particular semiotic theories.
6 The emphasis on sign-action dominated Peirce’s later and more mature views on sign and semiosis.
However, especially in his early papers (most notably in “On a New List of Categories”, CP 1.545-559,
1867), the concept of sign was viewed and derived as a kind of transcendental concept which can hardly
be interpreted as a dynamic one. (cf. Vehkavaara 2006). About the distinction between sign-object and
sign-action see e.g. Deledalle (2000: 38–39).
7 The object of a sign does not have to be any concrete particle or other material thing — it can
be anything (a material thing, perception, idea, lawful behavior of nature, dream, etc.) which excites
the mind to search some better or fuller representation of it. However, this requires that the object
is somehow beforehand, by some collateral observation, acquainted — the sign cannot provide the
sole access to the object (cf. EP 2:408-9,429, 1907). Still, the sign does not necessarily only draw the
interpreter’s attention to the object, but that it may also provide some new information about the object.
8 The conception of a belief as a deliberate or partly conscious habit of action is one of the core
conceptions in pragmatism (cf. CP 5.12, 1907). “A belief in a proposition is a controlled and contented
habit of acting in ways that will be productive of desired results only if the proposition is true.” (EP
2:312, 1904)
9 See especially Artmann (in this volume) and also Barbieri (2002) on Morse code and his organic
meaning.
10 This intimate participation in the science of his time influenced greatly both his conception of science
and the content of his philosophy. Peirce’s metaphysics took its inspiration —besides from modern
logic and mathematics— from the latest achievements of the natural sciences of the 19th century.
The most important of these were Kirchoff’s Spectroscopy in 1859, Mendeleev’s Periodic Table in
1852, Rankine’s, Clausius’, and Kelvin’s thermodynamics from 1850 onward, Pasteur’s findings in
microbiology from 1848 onward, and the most of all, Darwin’s natural selection in 1859.
11 “There is a mathematical logic, just as there is a mathematical optics and a mathematical economics.
Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed, is mathematics. Formal logic,
however, is by no means the whole of logic, or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned
as a part of logic proper.” (CP 4.240, 1902.) However, in ‘logic proper’ Peirce included both
epistemology (Speculative grammar, “the general theory of the nature and meanings of signs”)
and general methodology (Methodeutic or Speculative rhetoric, “which studies the methods that
ought to be pursued in the investigation”) along with Logical Critic, logic in narrow sense, “which
classifies arguments and determines the validity and degree of force of each kind” (EP 2:260, 1903,
CP 2.206–207, 1901).
12 Peirce used the term ‘logic’ as the name of the logical science and not to refer to its object of study
which is another common use of the term ‘logic’ (e.g. in phrases ‘women’s logic’ or ‘logic of the
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Book_Barbieri_1402048130_Proof1_August 7, 2006
278 Vehkavaara
universe’). Logic in this latter meaning is, especially if considered as a description of a real phenomenon,
rather a question of metaphysics or psychical sciences than of logical science.
13 This is Peirce’s solution to the problem that thought is, in itself, quite an abstract and vague concept,
which is hard to grasp because of its internal, immaterial, temporary, and flexible characters. The 20th
century western philosophy, almost every branch of it, has tried to solve this problem in another way,
by making a ‘linguistic turn’, by considering only linguistically expressible thoughts and language as
the medium of thought. Structuralism based on Saussure’s semiological vision is a one form of it.
14 See Hoffmeyer (1993: 25–27) and Brier (2003: 74). These insights have not necessarily been adopted
straight from Peirce’s writings but some of them might have been already adopted from other sources
(e.g., Gregory Bateson) and Peirce’s writings are just found to appear as compatible with them.
15 It can be argued that logic of science was not only Peirce’s starting point (or motive) but also one of
his main purposes of his theory (cf. Vehkavaara 2006).
16 One of the central characteristic of Peirce’s metaphysics is his strong ‘three category realism’ or
“extreme scholastic realism” (CP 8.208, c.1905). This consists of the acceptance that not only singular
existent events are real, but that also possibilities and some general objects (like laws and habits) are real.
This does not mean that all generals were real since, according to Peirce, nobody ever thought that “but
the scholastics used to assume that generals were real when they had hardly any, or quite no, experiential
evidence to support their assumption; and their fault lay just there, and not in holding that generals could
be real” (EP 2:342, 1905). The counterpart to ‘real’ is not ‘ideal’ but ‘figment’ or ‘illusion’: “A figment is
a product of somebody’s imagination; it has such characters as his thought impresses upon it. That those
characters are independent of how you or I think is an external reality. […] Thus we may define the real as
that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be.” (EP1:136, 1878) This, in
turn, does not mean that what is relative to thought cannot be real. “Red is relative to sight, but the fact that
this or that is in that relation to vision that we call being red is not itself relative to sight; it is a real fact”
(EP 2:343, 1905).
17 According to Synechism, we must not say
– “that the sum of the angles of a triangle exactly equals two right angles, but only that it equals
that quantity plus or minus some quantity which is excessively small for all the triangles we can
measure”
– “that phenomena are perfectly regular, but only that the degree of their regularity is very high indeed”
– “being is, and not-being is nothing.” like Parmenides but “that being is a matter of more or less”
– “I am altogether myself, and not at all you,” i.e. “synechism recognizes that the carnal consciousness
is but a small part of the man. There is, in the second place, the social consciousness, by which a
man’s spirit is embodied in others, and which continues to live and breathe and have its being very
much longer than superficial observers think.” (CP 7.568–575, 1892.)
18 Peirce viewed Darwinian evolution as an example of tychastic evolution. The other possible types
of evolution considered by Peirce were anancastic evolution by mechanical necessity and agapastic
evolution by ‘evolutionary love’ i.e. by force of a self-organizing habit. Lamarckian evolution was
Peirce’s example of agapastic evolution. (See more later, and in CP 6.300–302, 1893.)
19 “[A]n explanation should tell how a thing is done, and to assert a perpetual miracle seems to be an
abandonment of all hope of doing that, without sufficient justification” (CP 2.690, 1878).
20 “[B]y supposing the rigid exactitude of causation to yield, I care not how little — be it but by a
strictly infinitesimal amount — we gain room to insert mind into our scheme, and to put it into the place
where it is needed” (CP 6.61, 1892).
21 Peirce himself defines the most abstract sense of ‘mind’ as following: “Mind has its universal mode
of action, namely, by final causation. The microscopist looks to see whether the motions of a little
creature show any purpose. If so, there is mind there.” (CP 1.269, 1902.) The general abstracted concept
of mind or thought do not contain any assumption of its self-consciousness or of free will though Peirce
by no means rejects the real possibility of self-conscious mind equipped with free will: “Thought is
often supposed to be something in consciousness; but on the contrary, it is impossible ever actually to
be directly conscious of thought. It is something to which consciousness will conform, as a writing may
conform it. Thought is rather of the nature of a habit, which determines the suchness of that which may
come into existence, when it does come into existence.” (EP 2:269, 1903.)
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22 “How To Make Our Ideas Clear” is the title of his perhaps best known paper (CP 5.388–410, 1878).
In it, the principle of pragmaticism occurs the first time as presented (though the words ‘pragmatism or
pragmaticism do not occur).
23 The idea of pragmatism was developed in early 1870’s, in the conversations of the ‘Metaphysical
Club’, a small group of young Cambridge philosophers (and lawyers) lead by Peirce, William James,
and Chauncey Wright. It was not until 1898 when James, Peirce’s life long friend and both philosophical
and financial supporter in the last years of his life, first brought the term ‘pragmatism’ before the public,
which led to the tremendous popularisation of pragmatism around the turn of the century. Although
Peirce was probably the originator of the basic idea of pragmatism, Peirce and his pragmaticism (renamed
in 1904, in order to be safe from ‘kidnappers’, cf. CP 8.194, 5.414) was hardly known at all. The
leading pragmatists, James and John Dewey, nevertheless gave the honour to Peirce as the originator of
it, though even Peirce hesitated whether it was him or James who first used the term ‘pragmatism’ (CP
8.253, 1900).
24 “The meaning of a proposition is itself a proposition. Indeed, [  ] it is a translation of it. But of the
myriads of forms into which a proposition may be translated, what is that one which is to be called its
very meaning? It is, according to the pragmaticist, that form in which the proposition becomes applicable
to human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances, [  ] but that form which is most directly
applicable to self-control under every situation, and to every purpose. This is why he locates the meaning
in future time; for future conduct is the only conduct that is subject to self-control.” (CP 5.427, 1905)
25 The first written description about the pragmatic maxim was published in 1878: “Consider what
effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have.
Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” (CP 5.402, 1878.)
26 “Pragmaticism, then, is a theory of logical analysis, or true definition; and its merits are greatest in
its application to the highest metaphysical conceptions.” (CP 6.490, 1910)
27 Peirce’s main scientific interest and attention concentrated on what he called Theoretical science.
Theoretical science differs from Practical sciences according to the most general end of inquiry, the
end that functions as an ultimate criterion for the successfulness of the inquiry. Theoretical science
is ultimately guided and valued by the intrinsic end of inquiry, truth, while practical sciences are
guided by various practical ends, extrinsic for the inquiry. Theoretical science has two subbranches
H euretic Sciences or Sciences of Discovery and Science of Review or Retrospective Science. Mathematics,
Philosophy, and Special sciences are the three classes of Heuretic Science. Wheras Heuretic Science
is studying ‘directly’ the phenomena, the Retrospective Science is studying phenomena mediately,
collecting and uniting the results of different Heuretic Sciences. Thus, Synthetic Philosophy repre-
sented by Alexander Humboldt’s Cosmos, Auguste Comte’s Philosophie positive, and Herbert Spencer’s
Synthetic Philosophy are classified under the Science of Review. In addition, all considerations that relate
different sciences in general, e.g. histories and classifications of sciences belong under the branch of
Science of Review. Peirce named synthetic philosophy as Philosophia ultima in order to make difference
with Philosophia prima, the theoretical philosophy of Heuretic Sciences (EP 2:372–373, 1906).
28 The special sciences consist of two subclasses, physical and psychical. The difference between
physical and psychical special sciences is that ‘physics’ sets forth the workings of efficient causation and
‘psychics’ of final causation (CP 1.242, 1902). Physical and psychical phenomena are not independent
on each other since Peirce did not see final and efficient causation as alternatives, but some chain of
efficient causes is always involved in any event guided by a final cause (cf. CP 1.212, 1902).
29 Thus, every science has its mathematical part, but that part alone studies such forms from which all
concrete elements and references to the reality of the actual world are abstracted away (CP 1.133, 1894).
30 Before the first years of 20th century, Peirce recognized only two subdisciplines of theoretical
philosophy, logic and metaphysics, but in 1901-1902, Peirce’s conception about the philosophical science
deepened. He found out that theoretical philosophy actually contains a couple of other sciences that he
previously had not recognized it containing. According to this new conception, theoretical philosophy
divides into three subdisciplines, to phenomenology (later also phaneroscopy), normative sciences, and
metaphysics. Normative sciences divide further into three: to esthetics, ethics (renamed later as practics),
and logic (or formal semeiotic).
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31 “[  ] the observational part of philosophy is a simple business, compared, for example, with that of
anatomy or biography, or any other special science.
To assume, however, that the observational part of philosophy, because it is not particularly laborious,
is therefore easy, is a dreadful mistake, into which the student is very apt to fall, and which gives the
death-blow to any possibility of his success in this study. It is, on the contrary, extremely difficult to
bring our attention to elements of experience which are continually present. For we have nothing in
experience with which to contrast them; and without contrast, they cannot excite our attention.” (CP
1.133–134, 1894.)
32 This rejection (or doubt) of the reasonableness of the whole conception about a priori can be seen in
Peirce’s critique of Kant’s starting point:
“Immanuel Kant asked the question, “How are synthetical judgments a priori possible?” [  ] By a
priori judgments he meant such as that all outward objects are in space, every event has a cause, etc.,
propositions which according to him can never be inferred from experience. [  ] But before asking
that question he ought to have asked the more general one, “How are any synthetical judgments at all
possible?” How is it that a man can observe one fact and straightway pronounce judgment concerning
another different fact not involved in the first?” (CP 2.690, 1877.)
This latter question was Peirce’s starting point in the original derivation of the concept of sign (CP
1.545–559, 1867).
33 “Though infallibility in scientific matters seems to me irresistibly comical, I should be in a sad way
if I could not retain a high respect for those who lay claim to it, for they comprise the greater part of
the people who have any conversation at all. When I say they lay claim to it, I mean they assume the
functions of it quite naturally and unconsciously. The full meaning of the adage Humanum est errare,
they have never waked up to. In those sciences of measurement which are the least subject to error —
metrology, geodesy, and metrical astronomy — no man of self-respect ever now states his result, without
affixing to it its probable error; and if this practice is not followed in other sciences it is because in
those the probable errors are too vast to be estimated.” (CP 1.9, c.1897)
34 “Theoretically, I grant you, there is no possibility of error in necessary reasoning. But to speak
thus “theoretically,” is to use language in a Pickwickian sense. In practice, and in fact, mathematics
is not exempt from that liability to error that affects everything that man does. [  ] The certainty of
mathematical reasoning, however, lies in this, that once an error is suspected, the whole world is speedily
in accord about it.” (CP 5.577, 1898)
35 On the other hand, beliefs are far from forbidden for a scientist, quite contrary, they are indispensable
in his/her practical life. Even scientists have to cope with the life world of his/her own and in practical
decisions everyone should rely more on his/her instincts and beliefs rather than reason. Especially in
matters of vital importance, it would be unwise to rely chiefly on reason — reason is too slow and
fallible in practice if compared with instincts (no matter whether being culturally or biologically fixed)
that are tested in practice by past generations. (CP 1.633–639, 1898.)
“Here we are in this workaday world, little creatures, mere cells in a social organism itself a poor and
little thing enough, and we must look to see what little and definite task our circumstances have set
before our little strength to do. The performance of that task will require us to draw upon all our powers,
reason included. And in the doing of it we should chiefly depend not upon that department of the soul
which is most superficial and fallible — I mean our reason — but upon that department that is deep and
sure — which is instinct.” (CP 1.647, 1898)
36 The high standards of validity that Peirce gave to the philosophical science is underlined by the
modesty with which Peirce judged his own vocation to logic: Peirce claimed that he would not have
achieved much scientific results about signs, but that most of his propositions were based only on
“a strong impression due to a life-long study of signs” (EP 2:413, 1907). Three years before his death,
he still denied having tenable grounds for his “sundry universal propositions concerning signs” (EP
2:462, 1911). It is the insufficient amount of rational self-control that makes impressions, even if based
on life-long study and even if correct, not enough for true science. Impressions are derived directly from
intuitive feelings and the estimation of their validity is beyond rational self-control. Impressions of a
scientist are good only for hypotheses, but any claim or belief about their validity because they are ‘due
to life-long study’ do not belong to science.
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Book_Barbieri_1402048130_Proof1_August 7, 2006
The Relevance of Charles Peirce to Biosemiotics 281
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Artmann, Stefan (2006). Two Alternative Ways of Synthesizing Biological Knowledge through
Semiotics. This volume.
Barbieri, Marcello 2006. Editorial. This volume.
Barbieri, Marcello 2002. Has Biosemiotics come of age? Semiotica, 139(1): 283–295. Reprinted in this
volume with a Postscript.
Bickhard, Mark H. 1998. A process model of the emergence of representation. In: Farré, George L. &
Oksala, Tarkko (eds.), Emergence, Complexity, Hierarchy, O rganization (Selected and edited papers
from ECHO III). (Acta Polytechnica Scandinavica 91.) Espoo: Finnish Academy of Technology,
263–270.
Bradie, Michael 1986. Assessing Evolutionary Epistemology, Biology and Philosophy 1(4): 401–459.
Brent, Joseph 1998 (1st ed. 1993). Charles Sanders Peirce. A Life. (2nd ed.) Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
Brier, Søren 2003. The Cybersemiotic Model of Communication: An Evolutionary View on the
Threshold between Semiosis and Informational Exchange. Triple C 1(1): 71–94. Electronic journal:
http://triplec.uti.at/files/tripleC1(1)_Brier.pdf.
Campbell, Donald T. 1974. Evolutionary epistemology. In: Campbell, Methodology and Epistemology
for Social Science. Selected Papers. (Ed. E. Samuel Overmann.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press
1988.
Campbell, Donald T. 1997. From Evolutionary Epistemology Via Selection Theory to a Sociology of
Scientific Validity. (Ed. Celia Hayes & Barbara Frankel.) Evolution and Cognition 3(1): 5–38.
Deledalle, Gérard 2000. Charles S. Peirce’s Philosophy of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Emmeche, Claus & Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1991. From language to nature: the semiotic metaphor in biology.
Semiotica 84(1/2): 1–42.
Fisch, Max H.1982. Introduction. In: Kloesel et al. (eds.), W ritings of Charles S. Peirce. Vol. 1.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, xv-xxxv.
Fisch, Max H. 1986. Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism. (Ed. Kenneth L. Ketner and Christian Kloesel),
Bloomington (Ind.): Indiana University Press.
Hoffmeyer, Jesper 1996. Signs of Meaning in the Universe. (En Snegl På Vejen:Betydningens naturhis-
torie, 1993; transl. Barbara Haveland.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Hoffmeyer, Jesper & Emmeche, Claus 1991. Code-duality and the semiotics of nature. In: Anderson,
Myrdene & Merrell, Floyd (eds.), O n Semiotic Modeling. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 117–166.
Reprinted with annotations in Journal of Biosemiotics 1 (2005): 35–85.
Kant, Immanuel 1781/1787. Critique of Pure Reason, (K ritik der reinen Vernunft, transl.
J.M.D. Meiklejohn), Prometheus Books; Amherst (NY ) 1990.
Kent, Beverley 1987. Charles S. Peirce. Logic and the Classification of the Sciences. Kingston &
Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Kull K. (1999). Biosemiotics in the twentieth century: a view from biology. Semiotica 127(1/4), 385–414.
Lakoff, G. & Johnson, M. 1980. Metaphors W e Live By. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Lorenz, Konrad 1973. Die Rückseite des Spiegels: versuch einer Naturgeschichte menschlichen
Erkennens. München: Piper.
Peirce, Charles S. 1931–1935, 1958. Collected papers of C. S. Peirce. Vols. 1–6 (eds. Charles Hartshorne
& Paul Weiss). Vols. 7–8 (ed. Arthur W. Burks). Cambridge: Harvard University Press. [Cited as CP.]
Peirce, Charles S. 1992, 1998. Essential Peirce. Selected Philosophical W ritings. Vols. 1–2. (Ed. Nathan
Hauser et al.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [Cited as EP.]
Peirce, Charles S. 1982–1986. W ritings of Charles S. Peirce. Vols. 1–3 (Ed. Christian Kloesel et al.)
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [Cited as W.]
Saussure, Ferdinand de 1916. Course in G eneral Linguistics. (Transl. Roy Harris, 1983). Chicago & La
Salle (Ill.): Open Court 1997.
Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph 1985. Ausgewählte Schriften. Vols. 1–6 (ed. M. Frank). Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp.
Sebeok, T.A. 1963. Communication in Animals and Men. Language 39: 448–466.
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Book_Barbieri_1402048130_Proof1_August 7, 2006
282 Vehkavaara
Sebeok, T.A. 1976 Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Vehkavaara, Tommi 2002. Why and how to naturalize semiotic concepts for biosemiotics. Sign Systems
Studies 30(1): 293–313.
Vehkavaara, Tommi 2003. Natural self-interest, interactive representation, and the emergence of objects
and Umwelt: an outline of basic semiotic concepts for biosemiotics. Sign Systems Studies 31(2):
547–587.
Vehkavaara, Tommi 2006. Limitations on applying Peircean semeiotic. Biosemiotics as applied objective
ethics and esthetics rather than semeiotic. Journal of Biosemiotics 1(2) (in print).
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
B ook_B arbieri_1402048130_Proof1_A ugust5,2006
QUERIES TOBEANSWERED (SEEMARGINALMARKS)
IMPORTANT NOTE: Please m ark your corrections and answ ers to these
queries directly onto the proof at the relevant place. Do NOT m ark your
corrections on this query sheet.
C hapter-11
Q uery N o. Page N o. Line N o. Q uery
A Q 1 259 36 Please provide figure citation.
A Q 2 260 38 Please provide figure citation.
A Q 3 261 40 Please provide figure citation.
A Q 4 272 38 Please provide figure citation.
A Q 5 274 34 Please provide figure citation.
